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A quarter century after the last major legal-

identity card would fundamentally trans-

ization in the United States, there is much

form the information demands the United

evidence and a growing consensus that our

States government places on its citizens. The

current immigration system is unworkable

cards would be unreliable and inadequate

and in serious need of reform. One of the

to prevent fraud; would lead to privacy viola-

proposed solutions has been the creation

tions; and would place undue burdens on

of a Biometric Enrollment, Locally-stored

the poor. At the same time, the BELIEVE

Information, and Electronic Verification of

cards would likely be ineffective in targeting

Employment (BELIEVE) card that would

the employment of unauthorized migrants.

be mandatory for anyone—citizen or non-

We recommend that rather than spending
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citizen—employed in a U.S. workplace.
This plan was initially offered as part of a
bi-partisan

proposal

on

comprehensive

immigration reform and is likely to be part
of future comprehensive reform discussions. This paper analyzes the costs and
unintended consequences of such a proposal. Our analysis shows that the BELIEVE
system cannot achieve its goal of preventing
unauthorized employment.

tens of billions of dollars on an expensive, intrusive and ineffective program, the
government examine the root causes of
unauthorized migration and employment.
In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA), touting
the new law as a solution to the employment
of unauthorized immigrants. More than two
decades of experience suggests that IRCA
has been unable to prevent the employment

We estimate that establishing a biometric

of unauthorized workers and policymakers

employment card would cost almost $40

are once again searching for quick fixes.

billion at the outset, with ongoing mainte-

The BELIEVE system is not the answer; it

nance costs of at least $3 billion per year.

will cost us dearly at a time when we can

Requiring all working Americans to get this

least afford it.

* A. Michael Froomkin is Laurie Silvers & Mitchell Rubenstein Distinguished Professor of Law and Jonathan Weinberg
is Professor of Law at Wayne State University Law School. Aarti Kohli is Director of Immigration Policy at the Warren 		
Institute.
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BACKGROUND

others have been large (audit targets have included clothing

Before 1986, the federal government did not require
employers to verify that workers were authorized to work in
the United States. Congress established the current
employer verification requirement in the 1986 Immigrant
Reform and Control Act (IRCA). That statute also created
a system of sanctions to punish employers who knowingly
hired undocumented workers. Whenever a U.S. employer
hires a new worker, the worker must display identification
establishing his identity and showing that he is authorized
to work in the U.S. – either because he is a citizen, or
because he is a noncitizen (such as a green card holder, an
asylum recipient, or a holder of certain temporary visas)
whose immigration status entitles him to work. Some of the
documents workers typically provide to establish their
identity are driver’s licenses, U.S. passports, and green
cards. Some of the documents workers typically provide to
establish their work authorization are U.S. social security
cards, U.S. birth certificates or passports for citizens, and
green cards or other U.S. immigration documents for
noncitizens.1
The

employer

must

keep

records

of

that

documentation in a form called the I-9. Employers need
not seek documentation from, or fill out I-9s for, people
who are legally classified as independent contractors rather
than employees.
The Obama Administration has greatly expanded
enforcement of I-9 requirements in the past three years,
sharply increasing audits (so-called “silent raids”) of employers’ I-9 files. In FY 2010, ICE fined employers about $7
million for I-9 violations, ten times as much as in 2008. Some
targets have been small (as in one case where ICE sought to
fine a small Subway franchisee over $100,000 for I-9 violations, notwithstanding that there was no evidence the
business had actually hired an unauthorized worker);2

1. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(a)(2) (2010), U.S. Citizenship
& Immigration Servs., Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, available at
http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-9.pdf.
2. See USA v. Snack Attack Deli, Inc., 10 OCAHO no. 1137 (Dec. 22, 2010), http://
www.justice.gov/eoirOcahoMain/publisheddecisions/Looseleaf/Volume10/1137.pdf.
3. E-Verify: Preserving Jobs for American Workers 2011: Hearing Before House Comm.
on the Judiciary and Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement, 112th
Cong. (2011) (written testimony of Theresa C. Bertucci, Associate Director,
Enterprise Services Directorate U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services).
E-Verify has struggled with erroneous and obsolete entries in the databases
on which it relies, together with other obstacles to good performance; we
discuss these in more detail later in this paper.
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retailers Abercrombie & Fitch and American Apparel).
The U.S. government has also established a program
called E-Verify through which employers can seek to verify
new hires’ employment eligibility electronically, by checking the employees’ names, social security numbers, and
other identifying information against Department of
Homeland Security and the Social Security Administration
databases. Federal law makes participation in E-Verify
mandatory for federal contractors, but voluntary otherwise; about 11% of employers use it nationwide.3 Some
states, such as Arizona, have enacted laws making participation mandatory for employers in the state; the Supreme
Court has recently ruled that Arizona’s law does not conflict with the federal employment verification system
established by IRCA.4
The BELIEVE plan’s backers propose to replace current
verification systems with a new system under which every
worker in the United States would have to apply for and
receive a high-tech ID card.5 In order to get the card, the
worker would have to submit documents demonstrating his
identity and work authorization. He would also have to submit to the federal government a biometric identifier, such as
fingerprints or a scan of the veins in the back of his hand.6
The federal government would encrypt the worker’s biometric information on his card.
Under the BELIEVE scheme, each worker would have
to present that card to his employer. The employer (or a
separate private credential checking bureau, charging the
employer for the service) would then have to fingerprint
the employee or scan his hand, and would have to use
high-tech equipment to check the employee’s biometric
against the information encrypted on the card. Assuming
the employee’s biometric matched the one on his card, the
employer would then have to transmit the employee’s

4. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S.Ct. 1968
(2011).
5. Senators Reid, Durbin, Schumer, Leahy, Feinstein and Menendez
described the proposed BELIEVE system on April 29, 2010, in a document
initially labeled “Conceptual Proposal for Immigration Reform,” available
under the title “Real Enforcement with Practical Answers for Immigration Reform
(REPAIR) Proposal” at www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=31851.
6. The Conceptual Proposal, supra note 5, does not specify
which biometric would be encoded on the card. Knowledgeable
congressional staffers, however, indicated last year that the plan contemplated the use of either fingerprints or hand vein scans. We
assume the use of one of those two biometrics in this analysis.
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identity to a massive centralized database, maintained by

I. The BELIEVE System Would Be

the federal government, of people allowed to work in the

Prohibitively Costly

United States—including citizens, green card holders,
asylees/refugees, holders of a wide range of temporary
visas, and members of a variety of other immigration categories. If for any reason the federal government then
reported that the person was not entitled to work, that person would be prohibited from working and would have to
file an appeal with the federal government.
Imagine, thus, that Sally Stephens, born 41 years ago
in Flint, Michigan, has been working for sixteen years as a
forklift operator for Wilbur Industries. If the BELIEVE
proposal became law, she would have to report to a govern-

The Social Security Administration has estimated that it
will require $10 billion to create a biometric social security
card, an approach similar to the BELIEVE scheme. That
estimate is egregiously low. Our analysis indicates that it
would cost almost $40 billion to establish the BELIEVE system (including both direct costs to the federal government
and hidden costs imposed on employers and workers), and
another $3 billion annually to maintain it. (See Figure 1)

FIGURE 1 | Costs and Revenue for
BELIEVE Bio-ID System

ment office with documents establishing who she is and

Initial

that she is authorized to work in the United States. The

(in millions)

government would examine those documents and supplement them by “engag[ing] in background screening
verification techniques currently used by private corporations.”7 A federal government employee at that office
would take her fingerprints (or a scan of the veins in the
back of her hand); the government would then issue her a
worker authorization card with her biometric information
in encrypted form. This identity verification and biometric
capture process would take place more than 150 million

Costs

times in the start-up period, as the government issued
cards to every American worker.
Sally (along with 150 million other American workers)
would have to present that card to her current employer(s),
and to every future employer. The employer would use
equipment on its own premises (or those of a third-party
credential bureau) to check Sally’s fingerprints or other
biometric again, and make sure they matched those on the
card.

Assuming the biometrics matched, the employer

would then check Sally’s work authorization against the
master government database. If Sally’s biometric failed to
match that on the card (perhaps because of a fingerprint
error when the card was made), or the master database
erroneously reported her as unauthorized to work, she
would have to apply to the government bureaucracy to get
the problem fixed before being allowed to work again.

Revenue

Costs to
the Government
(hardware, identity
systems, E-Verify
expansion, staff
capacity, biomentric
ID cards for citizen
workers)

$22,626

$2,055

Costs to Employers
(biometric scanner,
training, third party
verification services)

$5,574

$211

Productivity Costs
(loss of worker
productivity and
addressing federal
government and/or
employer/third-party
verification errors)

$11,757

$884

Total Costs

$39,957

$3,150

Fees for Biometic
ID Cards
(collected from
employers, noncitizen
workers, and legal
permanent residents)

$1,794

$217

Total Revenue

$1,794

$217

$38,163

$2,933

Net Costs (Costs minus Revenue)1
7. “Conceptual Proposal,” supra note 5, at 10.
8. Social Security Number High Risk Issues Hearing Before Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. (2006) (statement
of Frederick G. Streckewald, Assistant Deputy Commissioner for Program
Policy, Social Security Admin.) available at http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/
testimony_031606a.html.

Annual

1. This cost chart relies upon conservative estimates. See detailed
cost charts in appendix for a range of estimates.
Note: Subtotals may not sum to totals due to rounding.
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To be effective, a worker ID system must have 100%
participation. The proposal contemplates that all employ-

a card cannot be modified to incorporate a different person’s biometric identifiers.

ers will be required to establish that all their employees

Biometric identification makes card issuance time-

have the legal right to be employed. The only way to

consuming and expensive. Every individual’s application

require employers to verify all their workers is to ensure

for a card would be an in-person transaction. The govern-

that anyone who has a right to be employed can be reliably

ment will have to establish a network of thousands of card

checked. An employer cannot be expected to demand a

issuance offices nationwide, presumably by going to exist-

card from a prospective worker, and certainly cannot be

ing government offices (such as post offices) and installing

penalized for failing to check the card, unless all eligible

new equipment, adding and training new staff, and allocat-

workers already have the cards and the infrastructure for

ing physical space for these operations. While vein scanning

card verification is in place. Nor would it work for the law

is a new and untested technology for which little data is

to require only that noncitizens produce a card: in that

available,9 we know that training people to take finger-

situation, noncitizens could masquerade as citizens and

prints is not a trivial endeavor. The U.S. Census Bureau

thus circumvent the card requirement. So employers must

recently had to fingerprint all its census-takers; it trained

demand cards from citizens and noncitizens alike, just as

staff people in fingerprint-taking for two hours, and even

they demand I-9 documentation today from citizens and

so 20% of the prints they took failed.10 Live scan technol-

noncitizens. The upshot is that before mandatory verifica-

ogy which produces digitized fingerprints would improve

tion can begin the government must:

those rates, but with any fingerprint technology there is

•
•

•
•
•
•

authorize an adequately staffed and funded government

reason to expect unreadable-print rates as high as 4-5%,11

agency to implement the ID card system;

and no lower than 1.5-2% in the best of circumstances.12

issue rules and regulations on methods for updating

Assuming an error rate of 2% in connection with worker

data, appealing denials of applications, and replacing

IDs, approximately three million people would have bad

lost or stolen cards;

prints taken. If those were entered into worker ID cards,

create the national database to which those card readers

all of those people would become unemployable until they

will be connected;

rectified the situation.

distribute (or sell) card readers to 7.4 million

The federal government could perhaps off-load some

workplaces;

costs onto state governments by assigning the card applica-

verify the identity of, and issue cards to approximately

tion process and biometric capture to state DMV offices.

150 million workers;

This would shift the costs from one budget to another, but

be prepared to respond to the same number

it would not significantly reduce them; state DMV employ-

of

ees have no equipment or training for fingerprint or hand

requests

for

verification

in

the

start-up

vein capture. Rather, assigning the work to state DMV

period alone.
About 156 million people are in the United States workforce, and would need cards. In order to succeed, the card
must have multiple levels of security. It needs to be difficult to counterfeit; it has to be hardened against improper
attempts to access biometric data in order to minimize the
risk of identity theft; and it needs to be tamperproof so that
9. See infra note 25 & accompanying text.
10. See 2010 Census: A Status Update of Key Decennial Operations, Before the Subcomm. on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services
and International Security Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
United States Senate (February 23, 2010) (statement of Robert M. Groves
Director US Census Bureau) available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/
releases/pdf/Groves_Senate_Testimony_2-23-10.pdf.

departments would simply impose an unfunded mandate.
Cash-strapped states would then face a choice between
expending funds to hire additional workers to cope with
the surge of new duties, or using the existing workforce.
Not adding workers means imposing more wasted time
waiting in line for the people applying for driver’s licenses,

11. See European Commission Joint Research Centre, “Biometrics at the
Frontiers: Assessing the Impact on Society,” EUR 21585 EN (2005), available at http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/publications/pub.cfm?prs=1235; Hearing Before the House Comm. On Homeland Security on TSA’s Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, 110th Cong. (2007)
(testimony of Judith Marks, President, Lockheed Martin Transportation
and Security Solutions) available at http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20071031111059-74695.pdf. (hereinafter “Testimony of Judith Marks”)
12. See Testimony of Judith Marks, supra note 11.
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a significant social cost that does not show up on state balance

sheets.

A

similar

choice—more

government

expenditure or more costs imposed on people waiting longer in line—would apply if the job were done in federal
post office facilities.
We estimate that direct costs to government covering
such items as hardware and staff training for biometric capture, establishing needed birth and death registration
systems, scaling up the E-Verify infrastructure, and disseminating educational materials, together with the costs of the
cards themselves, will exceed $22 billion for the initial roll-

Our own conser vative estimates,
summing to a little more than
$40 billion for the BELIEVE
program’s initial rollout, may
significantly underestimate
its costs.

out of the program. They will impose an additional $2
billion annually in ongoing costs.13 These direct costs to
the government, however, are only the beginning.

individual isn’t authorized to work. Anyone rejected for an

The BELIEVE plan contemplates that before an

ID card, or anyone who presents a valid card but is accused

employer could hire a new worker, the employer would

of not being the person to whom the card really belongs

have to check his or her ID, and confirm that the person

(say, due to an erroneous fingerprint mis-match), must

proffering the ID was the same person it was issued to. In

have a quick and effective means of correcting the mistake.

order to do this, the employer would need a biometric

As we will detail later, there is strong reason to expect fre-

scanner.

If the finger or hand the worker submitted to

quent errors in each of these categories. Error correction

the scanner matches the biometric encoded on the card,

will entail substantial costs both to the government and to

the scanner connects to a central government database to

workers themselves. Consider that today, when the E-Verify

confirm that the person has a right to work.

system gives workers a “tentative nonconfirmation” notice

14

The costs of this card-checking infrastructure will be

—a warning that government databases report they are not

large: Because the biometric data will be encoded on the

authorized to work—the workers need to make time in

card, the card-checking devices will need decryption capa-

order to attempt to resolve the database error. The error

bilities. What’s more, they will need to be sufficiently

correction costs of the BELIEVE program will be substan-

hardened to prevent anyone from cracking the code and

tially greater than E-Verify’s15, because BELIEVE will have

extracting the biometric data, which would create a risk of

to address biometric errors as well as database errors.

biometrically-enhanced identity theft for the card holder.

Under the BELIEVE plan, every biometric or database

In addition, businesses owning scanners would have to

error will mean a lost job, and lost wages, until the error

train employees to use them. Most workers will have to take

can be fixed and the worker employed. Even our most con-

time off work to get their cards—another real cost.

servative estimates suggest that the bill for lost wages due to

Because some information (such as name or immigra-

errors will be billions of dollars at the outset, and more

tion status) stored on the card could change, there will

than $65 million each year thereafter. We estimate that the

need to be a system for routinely updating information.

productivity costs to employers and workers of acquiring

Because workers’ cards will be lost or stolen, there will

cards, and remedying errors, for every employee in the

need to be a system for card replacement.

U.S. workforce, together with the direct costs to employers

The federal government will need a system for manual

for verification, will be in the range of $12 to $18 billion for

verification and investigation when the automated system

the initial rollout alone. Ongoing costs will be in the neigh-

reports that a biometric doesn’t match or that an

borhood of $1 billion yearly.16

13. See Technical Appendix to this report.

15. See discussion regarding errors in the E-Verify system. infra note 21

14. Our cost estimate assumes that employers with fewer than 500 employees
will save money by using a third-party verification service, rather than buying
biometric equipment and training employees in-house.

16. See Technical Appendix to this report.
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II. The Card Will Be Unreliable
The appeal of the BELIEVE plan is the idea that American

Even a 1% error rate would still result
in almost 1.5 million citizens and other

employers will be able to consult a trouble-free, reliable,
fraud-proof card that can tell them with assurance whether
the person standing before them is authorized to work.

legal workers being falsely accused of

The BELIEVE plan will not do that.

being undocumented aliens.

A. Data Quality
In issuing cards to U.S. citizens and others, the government will be relying on information derived from existing

An alternative starting point for estimating total direct
costs comes from the UK. A few years ago, the British government proposed a biometric ID card for the entire adult
population of that country. (The new Conservative-Liberal
Democratic government has since abandoned the plan as
“wasteful, bureaucratic and intrusive.”17) A London School
of Economics report assessed ten-year rollout costs for that
country’s biometric ID card program at $10-30 billion.18
Multiplying that estimate by a factor of three (to reflect the
fact that the UK plan was planned to cover a mere 50 million adults, one-third the size of the U.S. workforce19)
would yield a corresponding US estimate of $30-90 billion.
The midpoint of that range—$60 billion—is about oneeighth of total annual nondefense discretionary spending
in the federal budget.
It should be noted, though, that the UK plan contemplated a much smaller reader network than the BELIEVE
plan would require; in addition to having a much larger
population, the land area of the United States is more than
40 times greater than that of the UK. Thus, U.S. costs for
a network of verification locations would have to be substantially higher. This suggests that our own conservative
estimates, summing to little more than $40 billion for the
BELIEVE program’s initial rollout, may significantly underestimate its costs.

and who is not. No matter how good the security on the
cards, the system results will be unreliable if government
databases cannot accurately report which individuals are in
fact authorized to work. The extensive inaccuracies in current DHS and SSA databases, though, are well-documented.
According to the Social Security Administration (SSA),
there are errors in approximately 17.8 million records in
the NUMIDENT database used to check employment eligibility status. About 13 million of those incorrect records
belong to U.S. citizens.20 A recent DHS report found that
the E-Verify system had no more than 54% success in
detecting unauthorized workers.21 Anecdotal reports suggest that the system’s error rate in dealing with authorized
workers, while lower, is still quite high.22 While the DHS
report cheerily claims that the system finds only 0.8% of
authorized workers to be unauthorized,23 application of
even that statistic to the overall U.S. workforce would mean
that over a million authorized U.S. workers would incorrectly be found to be working illegally.
These error rates will likely have a disproportionate
effect on legitimate foreign-born workers and the industries that tend to employ them. For example, Intel
Corporation’s E-Verify queries in 2008 resulted in nearly
13 percent of Intel employees being initially flagged as

17.		 PA, Identity Cards to be Scrapped Within 100 Days, THE INDEPENDENT
[small caps], may 27, 2010,, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/newsuk/politics/identity-cards-to-be-scrapped-within-100 -days-1984447.html
(quoting Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg).

tration, Dec. 2006), available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF
audittxt/A-08-06-26100.htm (“we estimate that of the approximately 380 million
native-born U.S. citizen records in the Numident file, about 12.7 million contain
discrepant information that may result in incorrect Basic Pilot feedback.”).

18. London School of Economics, An Assessment of the UK Identity Cards Bill and
its Implications, The Identity Project, 2005, available at http://is2.lse.ac.uk/idcard/identityreport.pdf.

21. Westat, Findings of the E-Verify Program Evaluation, (Dec. 2009),
available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/E-Verify/E-Verify/Final E-Verify
Report 12-16-09_2.pdf, at ¶1.5.3. (hereinafter “Westat”)

19. We assume a linear relationship but understand that there would likely be
economies of scale.

22. See National Immigration Law Center, E-Verify: Why Mandatory Employer
Participation Will Stall Economic Growth And Job Creation, 2010, available at http://
www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/ircaempverif/e-verify-facts-2010-02-17.pdf.

20. Congressional Response Report: Accuracy of the Social Security Administration’s Numident File (Office of the Inspector General, Social Security Adminis-
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unauthorized, all of whom were found to be authorized

do not have fingerprints due to birth defects, skin diseases,

after a lengthy process. Under the BELIEVE plan, prob-

or accidents; others do not even have fingers. Persons

lems caused by erroneous or inaccurate information in

engaged in certain farming or industrial occupations that

U.S. databases could happen at multiple stages. An

can cause significant dermal abrasion may suffer from scar-

improper rejection could appear at the front end—when a

ring or wear which causes their fingerprints to appear

U.S. citizen or authorized noncitizen queued up for a card

changed to fingerprint readers. Dealing with these and

and had his fingerprints or vein scan taken, only to be told

other exceptional cases in an expeditious manner will

that the computer did not recognize his work eligibility.

require complex and expensive infrastructure.

A false rejection could also happen at the time a worker

Vein scanning is a new and relatively untried technol-

presented his card on starting a new job: if the initial work

ogy, with promising but still largely untested applications.

authorization was based on conditional lawful permanent

While it’s possible that the error rate for vein scan technol-

resident status or a nonimmigrant visa, he would have

ogy may be lower, at this stage of our understanding of the

to rely on the government data being updated correctly

technology any such assumption would be risky. All

for the system to continue to recognize his status. Poor

reported work carried out to date on hand vein biometrics

government record-keeping—which has been endemic in

has involved relatively small databases collected by

the relevant databases so far—would mean an erroneous

researchers working for the vein scanning technology ven-

rejection. Similarly, old records could easily lead to incor-

dors. “It is therefore not possible to… predict the likely

rect work authorization for a noncitizen whose visa status

false acceptance and false rejection rates that might be

had lapsed. Those lawfully authorized workers who are

expected of hand vein biometrics.”25 In sum, there is no

incorrectly rejected would have to remain unemployed

documented basis for believing that any biometric technol-

until their case worked its way through a bureaucratic

ogy will be able reliably to match cardholders to cards

appeals process.

without problematic error or failure rates.

B. Biometric Error

C. Fraud

Proponents of the BELIEVE proposal do not specify the

The BELIEVE plan’s biometric requirement is designed to

nature of the biometric the card would use, but congres-

ensure that the worker presenting an ID card to an

sional staff last year indicated that the plan contemplated

employer is the same person to whom the card was issued.

the use of fingerprint or vein scan technologies. Either one

But it does not ensure that the person applying for an ID

would require expensive equipment and trained person-

card is using her own name, rather than a stolen or false

nel. Even a very small error rate would have devastating

identity. The plan does require card applicants to present

effects on the workforce, and impose immense costs on the

identity documents such as drivers’ licenses. It is likely

government. Suppose, for example, that scanners were

therefore that the market in false documents will shift to

99% accurate. That 1% error rate would result in almost

providing underlying documents in a false or stolen name.

1.5 million citizens and other legal workers being falsely

As a National Academy of Sciences report has explained,

accused of being undocumented aliens.

“even the most secure documents issued by the U.S. gov-

As we have already noted, U.S. experience with finger-

ernment… have been forged with regularity”;26 fraudulently

print scanners in the field has generated substantial error

acquiring or forging less-secure documents, such as birth

rates. In a best-case analysis, one should expect unread-

certificates and drivers licenses, and then using them to

able-print rates of at least 1.5-2%, and possibly as high as

acquire more secure ones, such as passports, is even

4-5%.24 Nor is that the end of the problem. Some people

easier.27 The GAO recently released a report demonstrating

24. See supra note 9-10 and accompanying text.

National Research Council (2002), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.
php?record_id=10346#toc, 38.

25. Stan Z. Li & Anil K. Jain, E ncyclopedia of Biometrics 692 (2009).
26. Stephen Kent and Lynette Millet (eds.), ID s - Not That E asy : Q uestions
A bout Nationwide I dentit y S ystems Committee on Authentication Technologies and their Privacy Implications, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board (CSTB), Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences,

27. James Waldo, Herbert Lin and Lynette Millet (eds.), E ngaging P rivacy
and I nformation Technology in a D igital A ge , Committee on Privacy in the
Information Age, CSTB, Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, National Research Council (2007), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.
php?record_id=11896, 268.
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how easy it is to get a U.S. passport using fraudulent docu-

ID, it is hard to imagine how the program would work. By

mentation.

Even the highest degree of technological

the time day laborers finished being approved by a local

protections designed to keep the card itself secure will not

third party ID verifier, a good chunk of the workday will be

stop a person from being able to get a card using false ini-

over. But if ID verification required biometric capture and

tial documentation. There is no assurance that a worker

Internet access, how would these facilities be available on

whose biometric matches a valid card is thus in fact an

farms, or on trucks, or at casual (street-corner) labor

authorized worker.

recruitment sites? More generally, if these requirements

28

One important potential avenue for the generation of

are imposed on casual labor, then, as the cost of verifica-

false cards lies in the fact that any system must have a way

tion begins to approach their daily wage, it is hard to see

of replacing lost credentials; fraudsters will therefore be

how

able to impersonate real and existing workers. BELIEVE

Nor is it clear how the plan would apply to domestic

plan backers propose to store biometrics only on the ID

workers, companions, babysitters, and others hired by

card, not in the central registry. But that means when an

household employers.

casual

labor

will

remain

economical

at

all.

imposter shows up and claims to be “John Smith of 1234
Main St., CT” the only check will be the documents prof-

IV. The BELIEVE Plan Would Weaken

fered. If they have been stolen (or rented) from the real

Privacy Protections

John Smith, the fake John Smith can get a credential with

The BELIEVE proposal emphasizes that security features

his own biometrics. Ironically, in some cases, the fake John
Smith may have more evidence of being the real John
Smith than the actual one.
III. The BELIEVE Plan Would Burden the Poor

should protect the information stored on the card. Yet
the history of similar technology teaches that the cards’
encryption scheme would be broken soon enough.29
Once the encryption system on the ID card is broken, or
the master decryption key leaks or is reverse engineered,

The BELIEVE Plan will amount in the long run to a work

then all extant ID cards will become vulnerable to anyone

tax: the law will impose costs (and delays) every time some-

with the right sort of scanner. As the U.S. government

one wants to take a new job. This tax will fall hardest on the

puts more resources into building and enabling access to

poorest, and especially hard on casual labor hires, since

its national registry of legal workers—which will have data

they receive among the lowest wages, are hired for the

on almost every adult citizen and legal resident—it will

shortest period of time and experience high job turnover.

create a single point of failure for identity theft on a mas-

In order to follow the law’s requirements and get a card,

sive scale. There have already been instances of

workers will need to get their identity papers in order. But

employment eligibility verification data accidentally

the people who least have their papers in order tend to be

being released to the public;30 more generally, govern-

the poorest, most ill, or most in need of employment. The

ment and private company data breaches are frequent,

very people one would want to avoid hurting—homeless

and sometimes massive. From 2000 to 2008 state and fed-

persons, for example—are the ones most likely to be

eral government agencies exposed or mishandled about

harmed by a system that will in effect make them

530 million state and federal records containing personal

unemployable.

data.31 Exposure or hacking of this data could have cata-

If the plan were to provide that day laborers, say,

strophic consequences for individual data privacy.

should be treated as employees and required to present

28. Undercover Tests Show Passport Issuance Process Remains Vulnerable to
Fraud: Hearing Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and Subcomm. on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 11th Cong. (2010), (statement of Gregory Kutz,
Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items d10922t.pdf.
29. See, e.g., Global RFID passport encryption standard hacked within two hours by a
Dutch company RFID Gazette, Feb. 4, 2006, available at http://www.rfidgazette.
org/2006/02/global_rfid_pas.html.
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30. Sasha Aslanian, Warnings Issued After Possible Security Breach, M innesota
P ublic R adio News, Dec. 11, 2009, available at http://minnesota.publicradio.
orgdisplay/web/2009/12/11/security-breach.
31.		 Jay Cline, 530M Records Exposed, and Counting, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept.
9, 2008, available at http:www.computerworld.com/s/article/9114176/530M_
records_exposed_and_counting.
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V. The BELIEVE Plan Would Undermine Freedom
The Fourth Amendment ensures that people will “be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” While the
law in this area is complex and studded with exceptions,
as a general matter the Fourth Amendment protects
against invasions of a “reasonable expectation of privacy”
by a search or seizure. Americans today have a reasonable
expectation that they will not be fingerprinted or otherwise subject to biometric capture unless they are suspects
in a crime or seeking a position of particular responsibil-

The creation of a card and
a database that control each
individual’s right to work will
give the government new
leverage over citizens.

ity such as that of an intelligence officer, a police officer,
or someone who works with young children.
The Supreme Court has approved some searches for
non-law enforcement purposes32 if the search program’s
primary purpose constitutes a special need beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, and outweighs the pri-

transactions. The creation of a card and a database that

vacy interest at stake and the character of the intrusion.33

control each individual’s right to work will give the gov-

Although the courts have greatly broadened the “special

ernment new leverage over all citizens.34

needs” exception in the last decade, no program to which

Although they present it as only an immigration-

it has been applied was anywhere as large as the national

related matter, what BELIEVE plan backers have proposed

reach of a proposal to fingerprint (or vein scan) 156 mil-

is nothing less than a new, mandatory, national ID card.

lion people. This would be a radical new weakening of the

Their proposal seeks to skirt the national debate such a

Fourth Amendment.

radical proposal would normally require. It fails to take

Finally, although the proposed framework limits the

account of problems with the underlying databases that

use of the card for purposes other than employment veri-

will undermine their scheme. It dramatically fails to grap-

fication, there is no way to control future legislation.

ple with the true costs their proposal will impose both on

Employment eligibility verification is not all that this card

the public treasury and on the literally millions of inno-

is likely to be used for. Mission creep—the tendency of a

cent American citizens who will be denied the right to

bureaucratic project to expand beyond its original pur-

work—and suffer losses in pay—until the government

poses—is an inevitable part of any government program.

decides to permit them to be employed. It is telling that a

When the Social Security Card was invented, Congress

similar plan for a British national ID card was one of the

legislated—and the card itself warned—that it should not

first things abandoned by the new coalition government

be used for identification. Now the SSN is ubiquitous.

when it took office in 2010, due to spiraling costs and

The same will undoubtedly be the fate of this “hardened

public resistance. A similar fate likely awaits the BELIEVE

Social Security Card”: it will become necessary for access

proposal once the public understands the costs in money,

first to government programs, and then to private

privacy, and liberty.

32. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47-48 (2000).

34. There is precedent for denying federal ID documents to people whose behavior the government wants to improve: the US Code requires the Secretary
of State to refuse to issue (and, optionally, to revoke) a passport for anyone
accused by a state agency of owing $2,500 or more in child support. The statute
also immunizes the Secretary of State and the US Government for any liability
for these actions (42 USC 652(k)(2)). Similar rules allow most states to revoke
drivers or professional licenses held by “deadbeat dads.” The creation of an
“off” switch on the right to work opens the door to similar measures against
whoever becomes the disfavored group of the future.

33. See e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872-73 (1987); O’Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987).
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VI. Conclusion
Supporters of the BELIEVE plan would have the nation
expend huge, untold sums on a new ID card requirement that would require every U.S. citizen to be subject
to biometric capture and to submit to a government
regulatory scheme under which widespread errors will
inevitably and wrongfully deny a significant part of the
U.S. population the ability to work until those errors
work their way through the system. In return, we will get
a system of ID cards that will still not prevent fraud, and
will not end unauthorized employment; at best, it will
offer criminals a new revenue stream in the provision of
high-tech identification to unauthorized workers. The
plan will have significant negative effects on the ability
of the poorest among us to support themselves, while
contravening basic American values; offering government a new, powerful lever of control over the citizenry;
and threatening Americans’ privacy. There is no easy
answer to the question of unauthorized employment in
the United States.35 The BELIEVE proposal will not
eliminate the employment of unauthorized workers; it
will burden all American workers at a time when the
country can least afford it.

This report was made possible by generous grants from the Four Freedoms Fund, Ford Foundation and Walter and Evelyn Haas Jr.
Foundation. We would also like to thank Lisa Chavez, Sarah Lawrence, Sarah Martin and Elaine Mui for their edits and feedback.
The conclusions contained in this report are those of the authors and should not be attributed to our funders.

35. Scholars have noted that the lack of job opportunities in sending countries
and a market for low-skilled labor in countries are part of the root causes of
economically-driven migration. See Gordon H. Hanson, The Economic Logic
of Illegal Immigration (Council on Foreign Relations 2007).
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX:
BELIEVE System Cost Projections
Catherine Barry*
This appendix outlines the process and assumptions

20.23 million new entrants total to labor force

used to estimate the costs of a biometric employment

in first 5 years

card. Congressional proposals have been vague, suggesting

The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates 4.046 million

a variety of possible scenarios for a BELIEVE system

new entrants each year; the first 5 years of the BELIEVE

implementation and costs. The costs projected here are

program will see over 20.23 million new entrants to the

based on plausible assumptions and benchmarks from

labor force.

similar existing programs and accessible government

BLS estimate of annual new entrants in U.S. workforce: http://

projections. Calculations are outlined below, along with

www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2004/02/art3full.pdf.

citations to cost benchmarks and other sources of pertinent information.

work, but are currently not employed. Thus, they are part

Numerical Benchmarks:

of the labor force and constitute a cost to the government

156.35 million workers
The 153.7 civilians in the labor force in June 2010 include
both employed workers (141.73 million) and unemployed
workers (14.623 million). In addition, the labor force
includes 1.4 million in active military in 2009 + 0.25 million in the reserves (there were 1 million reservists in
2009, but 75% reservists hold jobs in the civilian labor
force according to a 2007 report; including 1 million
instead of 0.25 million reservists would mistakenly double-count civilian workers.)
BLS June 2010 Civilian Labor Force: http://www.bls.gov/news.
release/archives/empsit_07022010.pdf; Active military size
2009: http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos249.htm; Employment of
Reservists:

A note about the unemployed: Unemployed persons
are defined as persons who are actively searching for

http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/81xx/doc8114/05-

17-ReserveCallUps.pdf

who must provide cards and services related to each person required to participate in the biometric identification
program. On the other hand, because they are unemployed, the time required to obtain cards and correct
errors does not constitute a loss for employers; errors and
other factors associated with the unemployed are not
included as direct costs to employers.
A note about the self-employed: The self-employed,
though they do not fall within the mandate of the proposal, are not excluded from total workforce in the
calculations presented here. This is because 92-99% of
self-employed have been shown to be wage workers at
some point during their lifetime, suggesting that they
eventually acquire a biometric card.
Self-employed as wage-earners during their lifetime: http://www.
chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/economic_perspectives/2006/ep_3qtr2006_part2_rissman.pdf

* Catherine Barry is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Demography
at the University of California at Berkeley.
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Initial, One-Time Costs for BELIEVE Bio-ID System
Costs to the Government

(in millions)

Staff training on verifying identities (train 3 staff per 4,500 offices)

$67.5

Biometric hardware for passport offices

$13.5 to $337.5

Expanded capacity of E-Verify system to accommodate 7.4 million U.S. businesses

$1,119

National birth and death registration systems; HHS, SSA, and DHS standardize
information collected and reported by states

$300

Employer and public education campaigns

$410

Cards for 156.35 million employed citizen workers

$20,716.4

Total initial costs to government

$22,626.4 to $22,950.4

Costs to Employers

(in millions)

Biometric scanners

$153.8

Training on biometric scanners

$91.6

Third party employment verification services

$5,328.2

Total initial costs to employers

$5,573.6

Productivity Costs

(in millions)

Lost productivity for workers to obtain new card

$9,579.5

Cost of errors for worker verifications at federal offices

$1,088.8 to $4,355.4

Cost of errors for workers from employer/3rd party service verifications

$1,088.8 to $4,355.4

Total initial productivity costs

$11,757.1 to $18,290.3

Total Initial Costs

$39,957.1 to 46,814.3

Note that these estimates do not include costs for enhanced capacity of Office of Fraud Detection and National Security
and employer audits.

12
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border security program. Because the proposed bill is

ISSUANCE, YEARS 0-5

very similar to the proposed border security program, we

Create federal capacity to verify identities and employ-

also assume a scenario of hiring 3 persons at each of 4,500

ment eligibility.

US Passport offices, a total estimate of 13,500 new staff.

Workers must apply to the federal government to

(This is likely an underestimate given the 27,000 U.S. Post

receive a biometric card. This application must be done

Offices that alternatively could be utilized to administer

in person so that the government can verify a worker’s

the program. Another alternative scenario could be to uti-

identity and employment eligibility.

There are three

lize office capacity of 1,300 Social Security Administration

potential options for existing federal offices that are geo-

(SSA) offices to verify identities. This option seems less

graphically dispersed: U.S. Passport offices, U.S. Post

viable because of the limited capacity of such a small num-

Offices and Social Security Administration offices.

In

ber of offices and the time period allotted (5 years) to

their 2002 Technology Assessment, the US General

verify the number of workers involved (over 150 mil-

Accounting Office (US GAO) estimates that 3 staff per-

lion)). The 2002 assessment also estimates $5,000 spent

sons at each port of entry would be necessary to acquire

per staff person to receive training in biometric technol-

biometric measurements and troubleshoot for a proposed

ogy. To obtain the final cost projection, we multiply the
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estimated cost per staff person ($5,000) by the estimated

DHS to make grants to states to ensure the accuracy of

number of necessary staff (13,500) for a total cost of $67.5

birth records. Based on this estimate, we add an addi-

million. This is a lower-bound estimate because it does

tional $150 million for states to ensure the accuracy of

not include costs of recruiting applicants and other addi-

death records. Total estimate: $300 million. Set-up costs

tional human resources needs that would be required by

are likely to exceed these conservative estimates because

the initiation of the BELIEVE program. Technology costs

of the costs related to coordination among the three

are included in the section below ‘Expand E-Verify system

agencies.

to accommodate 7.4 million employers’ and are not

CBO Cost Estimate ‘Providing for Additional Security in States’

reflected here.

Identification Act of 2009’: http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/106xx/

US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment (with number of US

doc10666/s1261.pdf

Passport offices): http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03174.pdf

Enhance Current Capacity to Prevent Fraud

Cost of Biometric Hardware for Each Passport Office

The proposal is vague regarding enhancing fraud protec-

In their 2002 Technology Assessment, the US GAO

tion, an extremely important factor related to social

reports that fingerprint machines cost between $1,000

security/identity cards. What agency would be in charge

and $25,000 each. We estimate that each office will

of fraud protection? How much would it cost that agency

acquire three machines, one for each staff person trained

to hire staff and manage programs to prevent identity

in the technology, for a total of 13,500 machines. This

theft and fraud? We intentionally leave this item blank

reflects a lower-bound estimate, because the government

because we did not find a suitable benchmark. Leaving

may choose to acquire more expensive machines, and/or

this cost projection blank will lead to an underestimation

they may choose to acquire more than three machines on

of total BELIEVE system costs.

average at each office. Total estimates range from $ 13.5
- 337.5 million.
US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment: http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03174.pdf

Random Audits of Employers Who Deduct
Employee Wages
Again, the proposal is vague regarding its stipulation on
conducting audits of employers. How much would it cost

Expand E-Verify System to Accommodate 7.4 Million

the agency to hire staff and manage programs to conduct

Employers

audits? How many audits would be conducted per annum?

A 2008 US GAO projects a mandatory E-Verify program to

We intentionally leave this item blank. Leaving this cost

cost $838 million to accommodate 7.4 million employers

projection blank will lead to an underestimation of total

for years 2009-2012 to the USCIS (U.S. Citizenship and

BELIEVE system costs.

Immigration Service). In addition, the Social Security
Administration (SSA) estimates staff needs for years 20092013 to cost another $281 million. We sum these estimates
to obtain a baseline for initial BELIEVE program costs
over a 5-year period. Total estimate: 1,119 million.
US GAO Employment Verification Report 2008 (with total number of employers): http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08895t.pdf

Public Education Campaign
The government will need to educate over 156 million
workers, along with millions of future workers, on their
rights and obligations under the BELIEVE system. In
addition, the campaign will need to educate 7.4 million
businesses. We used the original public relations campaign budget as reported in a US GAO report for the

Establish National Birth and Death Registration System

2010 US Census as a benchmark because the U.S. Census

Three federal agencies (Health and Human Services

communications program is a large and expansive pro-

(HHS), the Social Security Administration (SSA), and the

gram designed to educate over 300 million people:

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)) will work

$410 million.

together to standardize birth and death information that

US GAO 2009 Communications Campaign Has Potential to

the states collect and report. A 2009 Congressional Budget

Boost Participation report: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/

Office (CBO) Cost Estimate budgets $150 million for

d09525t.pdf
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Cost of Producing Cards for the 156.35 Million Workers

verification would cost $8,400. Multiply cost ($8,400) by

A US GAO 2009 report estimates that expenditures for

the number of employers in the United States with 500 or

staff plus producing and storing information on biomet-

more employees (18,311): $153.8 million. In an alternate

ric ID cards equals $132.50 per worker enrolled in the

scenario, the total or partial costs of the scanners could

Transportation Worker Identification Program (TWIC).

fall on the government, but we assume that employers will

This program is very similar to the proposed BELIEVE

bear the cost.

program; it also requires that biometric identifiers be

2005 London School of Economics report ‘The Identity Project’

stored on a card to be scanned by potential employers.

http://is2.lse.ac.uk/idcard/identityreport.pdf; 2007 Business

Multiply cost of card ($132.50) by number of workers to

Data:

receive card (156.35 million employed and unemployed)

state_totals_2007.xls

for a total cost of $20,716.4. Both employed and unemployed workers will obtain the card to verify their current
work or obtain future work.
USGAO 2009 Transportation Worker Identification Credential
Report: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1043.pdf

Training Employees to Use Biometric Card Scanner
In their 2002 Technology Assessment, the US GAO estimates it would cost $5,000 to train each staff person to
utilize the biometric technology. As mentioned above, we
assume that it will be more cost effective for large employ-

Cost of Producing Cards for the 20.23 Million Individuals

ers to have an in-house biometric card-scanner. We also

Entering the Workforce in First 5 Years

assume that 18,311 businesses will average 1 staff person

We use the same US GAO 2009 report as mentioned

trained in biometric technology - some businesses will

above, estimating that expenditures for staff plus produc-

have more, but some businesses will have none and opt to

ing and storing information on biometric ID cards equals

use a third party business specializing in employment veri-

$132.50 per worker enrolled in the Transportation

fication. Multiply training cost ($5,000) by number of

Worker Identification Program (TWIC). Multiply cost of

staff (1) by number of businesses (18,311): $91.6 million.

card ($132.50) by number of new workers to receive card

US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment: http://www.gao.gov/

during the initial 5-year start-up (20.23 million) for a total

new.items/d03174.pdf

cost: $2,680.5 million.
USGAO 2009 Transportation Worker Identification Credential
Report: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1043.pdf

Expenses Related to Using a Third Party Service to
Verify Work Eligibility of Hired Workers
The 2002 US GAO assessment outlines a biometric airport

EMPLOYER COSTS—INITIAL SET-UP AND CARD

security program in the Netherlands in which users pay

ISSUANCE, YEARS 0-5

$89 and go through a 2-stage verification process. First,

Expenses Related to Verifying Work Authorization of

passengers undergo a background check, a passport

Potential Employees

Purchase of Biometric Scanners
For employers with at least 500 employees, we assume it
will be more cost effective for the employer to buy biometric equipment and train employees in-house rather than
use a third party service. According to a 2007 Small
Business Association report, the number of businesses
with at least 500 employees or more was 18,311 in 2007. In
addition, a 2005 report by the London School of
Economics on a similar biometric identity program proposed in the United Kingdom estimates that biometric
scanners to be used by employers for employment

14
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review, and an iris scan. The iris scan and other information are encrypted and embedded on a biometric ID card.
The second phase identifies and verifies each registered
traveler at the immigration checkpoint. We assume that
the process and steps described here are comparable to
the processes to be implemented by a third party service
as part of the BELIEVE program. We assume that all
employers with less than 500 employees will opt for this
program because of the costs involved in staff training
and acquiring biometric scanning equipment. In 2007,
59,866,924 people worked for business with less than 500
employees. Multiply number employed by small businesses (59,866,924) by the cost per person ($89) for a

H a r d t o B E L I E V E : t he H i g h C o s t o f a B i o m e t r ic I d e n t i t y C a r d

total cost to small businesses to verify the employment eli-

an individual ineligible to work in the U.S. In this exam-

gibility of their workers: $5,328.2 million. This is

ple, the worker will need to investigate where the error

an underestimate because it does not account for new

occurred (in the record-keeping of some particular office,

labor force entrants into small businesses during the first

in the scanning of the biometric markers, in the informa-

5 years.

tion encrypted in the biometric ID card), and one to four

US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment: http://www.gao.gov/new.

weeks to complete these steps is a conservative estimate.

items/d03174.pdf; Number of persons employed by business with

The June 2010 average weekly wage rate for all workers

less than 500 employees: 2007 Business Data: http://www2.cen-

was $768.27. Multiply a 1% (.01) error rate by the number

sus.gov/econ/susb/data/2007/us_state_totals_2007.xls

of workers (156.35 million) minus the unemployed

COSTS TO EMPLOYERS AND WORKERS—INITIAL
SET-UP AND CARD ISSUANCE, YEARS 0-5

(14.623 million) by the average weekly wage ($768.27) or
four weeks’ wages (4*768.27) for a total estimated cost of
$1,088.8 to 4,355.4 million. Unemployed workers are not

Loss of Productivity When Workers Take Time off

included here because errors and time lost for their card

to Get Card

acquisition would not constitute a loss for employers.

We assume that employed workers will have to be absent

Assuming a 1% error rate may lead to underestimates of

from work for 3 hours to obtain their card; this includes
travel time, wait time, and the time it takes to fill out
paperwork and scan biometric markers. The average
hourly wage rate was $22.53 in June 2010; this output will

costs involved given that the U.S. Census experienced a
22% error rate.
US GAO 2010 Census report: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10430t.pdf; BLS average weekly wage in 2010: http://www.

be ‘lost’ to employers. The total number of employed

bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf

workers equals the total number of workers (156.35 mil-

Errors When Verifying Employment Through Third

lion) minus the number of unemployed (14.623 million).
The unemployed workers do not constitute a productivity
loss for employers because they are not employed by any
business or entity; therefore they are not included in this
calculation. Multiply the average hourly wage rate
($22.53) by the number of hours missed (3) by the number of employed workers involved (141.73 million). Total
estimated cost: $9,579.5 million.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) average hourly wage rate
June 2010: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/
empsit_07022010.pdf

Party Services/Place of Employment
In addition to errors that occurred at the U.S. passport
offices, the same productivity loss may occur during the
employment eligibility verification process when one of
the 141.7 million employed workers are verified at their
current place of employment. We make the same assumptions as above in the ‘Errors when taking biometric
measurements at U.S. passport offices’, replicating the
cost range of $1,088.8 to 4,355.4 million.
US GAO 2010 Census report: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10430t.pdf; BLS average weekly wage in 2010: http://www.

Loss of Productivity Due to Errors - Current Workers

bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf

Errors When Taking Biometric Measurements at U.S.
Passport Offices
A 2010 US GAO report on the 2010 US Census revealed a
22% error rate in fingerprinting acquisition among
trained employees. We assume that biometric technology
equipment and training will improve and we estimate a
very conservative 1% error rate. In addition, we estimate
that these errors will result in a range of one to four
weeks’ missed wages because of the time and steps
involved in correcting errors such as misidentification as
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Annual Operating Costs for BELIEVE Bio-ID System
Costs to the Government

(in millions)

Ongoing Staff training on verifying identities (train 1 staff per 4,500 offices)

$22.5

Maintenance of biometric hardware

$2.0 to $47.3

Ongoing training of employer obligations

$0.46

Annual SSA report to Congress and Biennial GAO report

$0.67

Cards for 4 million new workers annually

$536.1

Replacement cards for 11.27 million workers annually

$1,493.3

Total annual costs to government

$2,055.0 to $2,100.3

Costs to Employers

(in millions)

Maintenance of biometric scanners

$21.5

New employee training on biometric scanners

$27.7

Third party employment verification services

$161.4

Total annual costs to employers

$210.6

Productivity Costs

(in millions)

Lost productivity for 12.08 million workers to replace card

$816.5

Cost of errors for over 4 million new hires at employer/3rd party service verifications

$31.1 to $124.3

Cost of errors for workers changing jobs

$36.4 to $145.6

Total annual productivity costs

$884.0 to $1,086.4

Total Annual Costs

$3,149.6 to $3,397.3

Note that these estimates do not include costs for enhanced capacity of Office of Fraud Detection and National Security
and employer audits.

GOVERNMENT COSTS—ONGOING YEARLY COSTS,

Biometric Machine Maintenance

YEARS 6+

We earlier assumed that 4,500 U.S. passport offices would

Ongoing US Passport Office Personnel Training and

acquire three biometric machines at $1,000 - 25,000 each.

IT Maintenance
In their 2002 Technology Assessment, the US GAO estimates a cost of $5,000 to train individual staff persons in
biometric technology. We assumed earlier that 3 staff persons per office are necessary to initiate the program for
156.35 million employed and unemployed workers, but
we assume that ongoing needs will be smaller. We assume
that after the first 5 years, the initial large staff and budget

16

The 2002 Technology Assessment report points out that
maintenance for these smaller machines equals 15% of
their initial cost and for larger machines the cost equals
14% of their initial costs. Multiply number of total
machines (13,500) by their initial cost ($1,000-25,000) by
their maintenance costs (0.14 or 0.15) for an estimate of
$2.0 - 47.3 million.
US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment: http://www.gao.gov/

needs will shift to lower ongoing maintenance. We assume

new.items/d03174.pdf

that 1 staff person will be retained at each of 4,500 US

Enhance Current Capacity To Prevent Fraud

Passport offices; this person will require updated training.

The proposal is vague regarding enhancing fraud protec-

Multiply training costs ($5,000) by number of staff (4,500)

tion, an extremely important factor related to social

for a total cost of $ 22.5 million per year.

security/identity cards. What agency would be in charge

US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment: http://www.gao.gov/

of fraud protection? How much would it cost that agency

new.items/d03174.pdf

to hire staff and manage programs to prevent identity
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theft and fraud? We intentionally leave this item blank

BLS estimate of annual new entrants in U.S. workforce: http://

because we did not find a suitable benchmark. Leaving

www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2004/02/art3full.pdf.

this cost projection blank will lead to an underestimation

Cost of Replacement SS Cards To US Citizens

of total BELIEVE system costs.

The social security card administration does not currently

Random Audits of Employers Who Deduct

charge fees for replacement cards; the government bears

Employee Wages

the costs. In a 2006 evaluation of the Social Security

Again, the proposal is vague regarding its stipulation on

Administration, the US GAO reported that 11.27 million

conducting audits of employers. How much would it cost

replacement cards were issued to US citizens. Multiply the

the agency to hire staff and manage programs to conduct

number of replacement cards (11.27 million) by the cost

audits? How many audits would be conducted per annum?

of the card ($132.50) to obtain an estimate of $1,493.3

We intentionally leave this item blank. Leaving this cost

million.

projection blank will lead to an underestimation of total

US GAO 2006 ‘Social Security Administration: Improved Agency

BELIEVE system costs.

Coordination Needed for Social Security Card Enhancement

Ongoing Training of Employer Obligations,

Efforts’: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06303.pdf; SSA no
charge for replacement cards: http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10002.

Workers Rights
We assume that the Equal Employment Opportunity

html#cost.

Commission will be in charge of training employers and

EMPLOYER COSTS—ONGOING COSTS, YEARS 6+

workers of their rights and obligations under the BELIEVE
system. We assume the agency budget for its Education,
Technical Assistance and Training Revolving fund ($4.617
million) will increase by 10% (.10) to meet the new needs
of the BELIEVE system for an estimated cost of $0.46
million.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Education,
Technical Assistance and Training Revolving fund: http://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/2010budget.pdf
Costs of Annual SSA Report To Congress/Biennial GAO
Report on BELIEVE System
The Social Security Administration (SSA) for 2010-2012
(3 years) projects the cost of $2 million to audit a variety
of programs. We divide this number by 3 to obtain a yearly
audit cost estimate of $0.67 million.
Social Security Administration estimate for audit costs: www.ssa.
gov/oig/recovery/workplan.pdf
Costs of Issuing Free Cards To People Entering Work
Force For First Time
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) projects an average
of 40.46 million new entrants to the labor force over 10
years; divide 40.46 million by 10 to get an annual estimate
of individuals entering the workforce for the first time
each year (4.046 million). Multiply this number by the
cost of the card per worker ($132.50) to obtain an estimated cost of $536.1 million per year in costs of issuing
free cards to new workers.

Maintenance of Biometric Scanners
We earlier assumed that 18,311 employers would acquire
one biometric scanner at $8,400 each. The 2002
Technology Assessment report points out that maintenance for biometric machines equals 14% of their initial
cost. Multiply number of total machines (18,311) by their
initial cost ($8,400) by 14% (0.14). Total estimated cost:
$21.5 million.
US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment: http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03174.pdf
Yearly Training on Biometric Scanners For
Replacement Hires
In their 2002 Technology Assessment, the US GAO estimates a cost of $5,000 to train each staff person in
biometric technology. We earlier assumed that 18,311
businesses will average 1 staff person trained in biometric
technology. We also assume that workers will turnover,
and replacement hires must be trained to use the biometric technologies. Multiply cost ($5,000) by number of staff
per business (1) by staff turnover rate (.0303) by number
of businesses (18,311 million). The number of replacement hires expected based on these calculations is 5,548;
at $5,000 each, the estimated cost is $27.7 million.
US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment: http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03174.pdf; BLS turnover rate: http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/pdf/jolts.pdf
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Expenses Related To Using A Third Party Service To

Lost Productivity Due to Correcting Errors with Third

Verify Work Eligibility of Hired Workers

Party/Employer Verification Services - New Workers

We use the same $89 cost to employers using a third party

As mentioned in earlier sections of this appendix, a 2010

service as described earlier in the section ‘Expenses

US GAO report on the 2010 US Census revealed a 22%

related to using a third party service to verify work eligibil-

error rate in fingerprinting acquisition among trained

ity of hired workers’. Assuming a 3% (.0303) turnover

employees. We assume a 1% error rate as a conservative

rate of the 59,866,924 persons working at businesses with

estimate. In addition, we estimate that these errors will

fewer than 500 employees, yearly costs projected: $161.4

result in one to four week’s missed wages. The June 2010

million.

average weekly wages was $768.27. This is again a conser-

US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment: http://www.gao.gov/

vative estimate on the amount of time it would take to go

new.items/d03174.pdf; Number of persons employed by business

through the steps to correct the errors. Multiply a 1%

with less than 500 employees: 2007 Business Data: http://

(.01) error rate by the number of new workers (4.046 mil-

www2.census.gov/econ/susb/data/2007/us_state_totals_2007.

lion) by the average weekly wage ($768.27); the upper

xls; BLS turnover rate: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/

range will include 4 weeks of missed wages (4*$768.27).

jolts.pdf

Total cost: $ 31.1 to 124.3 million. Unlike the initial startup phase requiring two steps of error correction (at the

COSTS TO EMPLOYERS AND WORKERS—ONGOING

post-office and at the employer/3rd party verification

YEARLY COSTS, YEARS 6+

site) new workers should possess the card, and have

Lost Productivity Due To Workers Taking Time Off Work

already corrected any errors related to the initial acquisi-

To Replace Lost/Stolen Card

tion of the card from the post office.

In a 2006 evaluation, the US GAO reports that the Social

US GAO 2010 Census report: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/

Security Administration (SSA) issued 12.08 million

d10430t.pdf; BLS estimate of annual new entrants in U.S.

replacement cards in 2005 to citizens and non-citizens. As

workforce: http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2004/02/art3full.pdf

described in earlier sections, we assume that workers will

Lost Productivity Due to Correcting Errors—

have to be absent from work for 3 hours to obtain their
card; this includes travel time, wait time, and the time it
takes to fill out paperwork and scan biometric markers.
The average hourly wage rate was $22.53 in June 2010;
these wages will be ‘lost’ to workers. Multiply the average
hourly wage rate ($22.53) by the number of hours missed
(3) by the number of workers involved (12.08 million) to
obtain an estimate of $816.5 million.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) average hourly wage rate 2010:
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf;

US

GAO

2006 ‘Social Security Administration: Improved Agency
Coordination Needed for Social Security Card Enhancement
Efforts’: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06303.pdf
Lost Productivity Due To Correcting Errors From U.S.

Worker Turnover
The average worker turnover rate is 3.03%; when workers
change jobs, they must go through the process of matching their biometric markers with their biometric
identification card for their new employers. We multiply
the number of currently employed workers (141.7 million) by the turnover rate (.0303) by the 1% error rate
described above (.01) and one to four weeks’ worth of
wages ($768.27 or 4*768.27) to obtain the costs of errors
associated with employee turnover. Total estimate: $32.9
to 131.9 million.
US GAO 2010 Census report: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10430t.pdf; BLS turnover rate: http://www.bls.gov/news.
release/pdf/jolts.pdf

Passport Offices – New Workers
Not applicable. New hires should have corrected errors
from US Passport offices when they first acquired the card
(and they were not working for any employer yet), so we
assume no lost productivity to employers at this stage.
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Initial and Annual Potential Revenue for BELIEVE Bio-ID System
& Initial and Annual Net Costs
Initial Revenue: Launch through Year 5

(in millions)

Fees collected from employers for non-citizen worker authorizations

$81.9 to $255.8

Fees from noncitizen workers purchasing biometric ID cards

$841.2

Fees from legal permanent residents purchasing biometric ID cards

$870.5

Total Initial Revenue

$1,793.6 to $1,967.5

Annual Revenue: Year 6 and later

(in millions)

Fees collected from employers for non-citizen worker authorizations

$16.4 to $51.2

Fees from noncitizen workers purchasing biometric ID cards

$168.3

Fees from legal permanent residents purchasing biometric ID cards

$32

Total Annual Revenue

$216.7 to $251.5

Net Initial Costs (Cost minus Revenue)

$38,163.4 to $44,846.5

Net Annual Costs (Cost minus Revenue)

$2,932.9 to $3,145.8

Note that these estimates do not include revenue from fines for non-compliance.

POTENTIAL REVENUE SOURCES: INITIAL SET-UP AND

the Department of Homeland Security reports that 1.27

CARD ISSUANCE, YEARS 0-5

million non-citizen workers (a combination of workers &

Employment Authorization System Fee Issued to

trainees and intracompany transfers) gained admission to

Employers Who Petition for Non-Citizen Workers
As with employment-based visas, we assume that employers interested in petitioning for non-citizen workers will
have to pay a yearly fee to do so. According to public data
available by the Department of Labor, we calculated that
51,166 business filed petitions for non-citizen workers in
2009. Current fees related to immigration-related petitions range from $320 to $1,000. Multiply the potential
fee ($320 to $1,000) by the number of businesses per year
(51,166) by the initial 5 year phase to estimate potential
revenue at $81.9 to $255.8 million.

the United States to work in 2009. We assume that noncitizen workers would pay the cost of a biometric
identification card as described earlier in this appendix
($132.50). Multiply $132.50 by the number of non-citizen
admits (1.27 million) to estimate potential revenue from
this source for one year; the initial setup will take place
over 5 years, so multiply that number by 5. Potential revenue estimate: $841.4 million.
Non-immigrant admissions to the United States 2009: http://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ni_
fr_2009.pdf

Department of Labor (DOL) non-citizen petition data: http://

Cost of New Card for Currently Present Legal

www.flcdatacenter.com/CaseData.aspx; United States Customs

Permanent Residents (LPRs)

and Immigration Services Fee Schedule: http://www.uscis.gov/

Non-Citizens are the Only Persons to be Charged for

portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6

New Biometric ID Cards

d1a/?vgnextoid=b1ae408b1c4b3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60

First we must estimate the number of LPRs currently

aRCRD&vgnextchannel=b1ae408b1c4b3210VgnVCM100000

working in the U.S. We multiply the 12.6 million legal

b92ca60aRCRD

permanent residents (LPRs) present in the U.S. currently

Cost of New Card For New Non-Citizens Admits

as reported by the Department of Homeland Security

Non-Citizens are the Only Persons to be Charged for
New Biometric ID Cards
In Table 2 of their 2009 report on non-citizen admissions,

(DHS) by 0.79 (DHS data on LPRs demonstrate that
approximately 79% of the LPR group is of working age
16-65). We assume that LPRs participate in the labor force
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at similar rates as the total U.S. population, a 66% (0.66)

Cost of New Card for New Non-Citizens Admits

participation rate. Multiply 12.6 million LPRs by 79% of

Non-Citizens are the Only Persons to be Charged for

working age and a 66% labor force participation among

New Biometric ID Cards

those of working age. We obtain an estimate of 6.57 mil-

As mentioned above, in Table 2 of their 2009 report on

lion LPRs in the labor force who will pay for a biometric

non-citizen admissions, the Department of Homeland

identification card. This is an underestimate because new

Security reports that 1.27 million non-citizen workers (a

LPRs entering the labor force during the first 5 years are

combination of workers & trainees and intra-company

not included here. Revenue estimate: $870.5 million.

transfers) gained admission to the United States to work

Estimates of Legal Permanent Resident Population in 2008:

in 2009. We assume that non-citizen workers would pay

www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_lpr_

the cost of a biometric identification card as described

pe_2008.pdf; BLS Civilian Labor Force Participation rates by

earlier in this appendix ($132.50). Multiply $132.50 by

age, sex, race and ethnicity: http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_

the number of non-citizen admits (1.27 million) to esti-

table_303.htm

mate potential revenue from this source for one year.

Fines Charged to Persons or Entities Subject to the

Potential revenue estimate: $168.3 million.

Immigration and Nationality Act Who Do Not Comply

Non-immigrant admissions to the United States 2009: http://

with This Law

www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ni_

Intentionally left blank. The proposal is vague on what

fr_2009.pdf

the fine might be, how many people may not comply with

Cost of New Card for Newly Admitted Legal Permanent

the law, what agency will be in charge of administering

Residents (LPRs)

the fines and the costs of administration. Leaving this

In 2009, 463,042 LPRs entered the U.S. As previously

item blank underestimates net revenue arising from fines

mentioned, we assume that LPRs participate in the labor

if the fines collected exceed the cost of administration;

force at similar rates as the U.S. population, a 66% (.66)

conversely, leaving this item blank overestimates the net

participation rate. DHS data on LPRs demonstrate that

revenue arising from fines if fines collected are less than

approximately 79% (.79) of the LPR group is of working

the costs of administration.

age 16-65. Multiply number of admitted LPRs (463,042)

ONGOING POTENTIAL REVENUE SOURCES, YEARS 6+
Employment Authorization System Fee Issued to
Employers Who Petition for Non-Citizen Workers

ticipation rate (.66) to obtain an estimated 241,430 of
LPRs annually who will need to obtain a BIOID card.
Multiply this number by the cost of a new card ($132.50)

We assume that employers interested in petitioning for

for $32 million in potential revenue.

non-citizen workers will have to pay a yearly fee to do so.

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/

According to public data available by the Department of

lpr_fr_2009.pdf

Labor, we calculated that 51,166 business filed petitions
for non-citizen workers in 2009. Current fees related to
immigration-related petitions range from $320 to $1,000.
Multiply the potential fee ($320 to $1,000) by the number
of businesses per year (51,166) to estimate potential
yearly revenue at $16.4 to 51.2 million.
Department of Labor (DOL) non-citizen petition data: http://
www.flcdatacenter.com/CaseData.aspx; United States Customs
and Immigration Services Fee Schedule: http://www.uscis.gov/
portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6
d1a/?vgnextoid=b1ae408b1c4b3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60
aRCRD&vgnextchannel=b1ae408b1c4b3210VgnVCM100000
b92ca60aRCRD
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by percentage of working age (.79) by the labor force par-
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Fines Charged to Persons or Entities Subject to the
Immigration and Nationality Act Who Do Not Comply
with This Law
Left intentionally blank. The proposal is vague on what
the fine might be, how many people may not comply with
the law, what agency will be in charge of administering
the fines and the costs of administration. Leaving this
item blank underestimates net revenue arising from fines
if the fines collected exceed the cost of administration;
conversely, leaving this item blank overestimates the net
revenue arising from fines if fines collected are less than
the costs of administration.
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